

Battle of Kapyong

Modeling, Simulation, and Military Gaming

Hot Wash

April 21st, 2025

Introductions




Gabriel Rogers
B.S. Mech. Engineering



Donovan Sheppard
B.S. Math



Andrew Solano
B.S. International Affairs



Jack Keller
M.S. Computer Science



Aditya Yadavalli
M.S. Computer Science

Agenda

1. Context & Motivation
2. Research Question
3. Model
4. Analysis
5. Conclusion



Bottom Line Up Front

- Impossible win
- UN Forces abandoned equipment to climb to higher ground
- Steepness is the most important factor for victory



Battle of Kapyong – The Last Stand at Hill 677

Korean War – April 22–25, 1951

Context:

- Last stand against Chinese to prevent fall of Seoul
- UN forces retreated to Hill 677, a strategic high ground

Key Facts:

- 2,000 Chinese troops attacked
- 100 UN defenders - supported by nearby artillery
- An ammo truck had to be abandoned during retreat
- Despite being outnumbered 20:1, the defenders held the hill

Result:

- The UN Successfully defended Hill 677
- UN: 33 casualties
- PVA: ~1,000 casualties



Research Question

Motivation:

- It is difficult and sometimes impossible to carry heavy equipment up steep terrain. When faced with a decision to abandon equipment to gain a steeper position, how critical is it to acquire a steeper position, and how much equipment should be abandoned?

Question:

- How does the steepness of a defensive position and the amount of weaponry affect the attacker's casualty rate in battle, considering soldier fatigue?

Hypothesis:

- In general, steeper defensive positions result in higher attacker casualty rates. However, while additional heavy weapons initially increase casualty rates, their effectiveness diminishes at higher steepness due to soldier fatigue from carrying them.

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables
Hill Steepness	Casualty Rate (troops/hr)
Number of Weapons	Time (hrs)

Model


Environment

- **Model Dimensions**


- Netlogo: 201 x 201 pixels
- Real distance: 2.25 x 2.25 miles
→ 18 x 18 meters per pixel

- **Pixel Parameters**

- Elevation (m.)
- Steepness (°)



Battlefield diagram [12].



Satellite image (Google Earth) [5].

Agents

UN Forces (2 PPCLI D Company & 16 NZFR Artillery)

Type	Count	Varies? (Y/N)
Soldier	100*	N
Artillery	24	N
Mortar	3	Y
Machine gun	2	Y

Weaponry

Bolt-action rifle

Bayonet

Grenade

Chinese Forces (PVA 118th Division)

Type	Count	Varies? (Y/N)
Soldier	2000**	N

Weaponry

Sub-machine gun

*2 PPCLI consisted of 700 troops total; we estimate D company had 100 [13].

**PVA assault consisted of 5,000 troops total; we estimate D company fought 2,000 [4,11,13].



setup

go

respawn forces

hill_multiplier

0.97

hill_cover

0.07

On

Off

use-custom-sliders

steepness

1.00

weapons

0.25

*25% is historically accurate

total sim. time (hours)

0.13

UN machine guns

2

UN mortars

3

troops per agent

5

UN:

initial troops








100

remaining

100

current un hit rate (troops/hr)

0



PVA:

initial troops



2000

remaining



1995

current pva hit rate (troops/hr)

0



Model Dynamics: Rifles & Machine Guns




Shooting downhill is more effective than uphill.

Model Dynamics: Artillery & Mortars




Artillery Barrage



Artillery and mortars target denser areas of troops.

Model Dynamics: Soldier Fatigue







Based on military and physiological research [1,3,8,10].

Analysis





Analysis: Casualty Rate vs. Steepness

Increasing Steepness Lowered Casualty Rate







Analysis: Casualty Rate vs. Weapons

Increasing Weapons Increased Casualty Rate







Analysis: Time vs. Steepness

Time and Steepness positively correlated; exponential relationship




Analysis: Time vs. Weapons

No Clear Correlation



Overall Findings

- < 50% steepness (15°)
→ **rarely successful**
- < 25% weapons (2 MGs, 3 mortars)
→ **rarely successful**
- Favor Mixed Strategy
- Historical case:
100% steepness (30°),
25% weapons



Conclusion

- **Research Question**

- How does the steepness of a defensive position and the amount of weaponry affect the casualty rate in battle, considering soldier fatigue?

- **Results**

- Steeper terrain prolongs the battle; weapons increase lethality
- Steeper position leads to lower casualty rate; weapons to higher rate
- Steepness is the most important factor for victory

- **Key Takeaway**

- Take the steepest hill, and bring as much weaponry as possible - provided you can make it to the top

References

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
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Appendix


1. [Model Overview \(Flowchart\)](#)
2. [Steepness vs. Equipment](#)
3. [Soldier Fatigue](#)
4. [Exercise Recovery Over Time](#)
5. [Additional Analysis](#)

Model Overview




Steepness vs. Equipment


x1.0 (real scale)





x0.75



x0.5



x0.01 (flat)




Equipment

Soldier Fatigue


- **Key Assumptions**

- Initial fatigue depends on both hill steepness and number of weapons [3,8,10]
- Baseline fatigue increases with initial fatigue [1]
- Fatigue reduces overall effectiveness [3]
 - Accuracy
 - Fire rate

Note: Only considering fatigue from physical exertion.







Exercise Recovery Over Time







According to the School of Physical Education and Sport at the University of Sao Paulo. ^[1]

Analysis: Casualty Ratio vs. Steepness



Analysis: Casualty Ratio vs. Weapons



- Casualty Ratio is PVA Deaths / UN Deaths
- Higher Steepness, lower variance
- Higher weapons, higher casualty ratio
- Casualty ratio is low for steepness below .5 regardless of weapons